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CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
congress convenes in 1990, it will no longer be an exclusively governmental
domain, but more of a public exchange between governments and Indian
organizations-which, after all, can represent a more concrete achievement
than paper declarations.
RUSSEL LAWRENCE BARSH*
THE THREE "THEME" SPECIAL RAPPORTEURS OF THE
UN COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
In March 1982, the United Nations Commission on Human Rights ini-
tiated the appointment of a Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary
Executions. The Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions
has done far more than merely study that grave human rights problem; he
has received complaints about impending and past executions, issued appeals
to governments about threatened executions and the need to investigate
past killings, and reported publicly on much of his activity. The Commission
on Human Rights not only has renewed the Special Rapporteur on Summary
or Arbitrary Executions in its subsequent annual sessions, but has followed
this precedent by appointing in 1985 a similar Special Rapporteur on Torture
and in 1986 a Special Rapporteur on Intolerance and Discrimination Based
on Religion or Belief.
The development of the "theme" special rapporteur is a relatively new
and remarkably flexible approach to implementing international human
rights norms. Although the concept grew out of the practice of the Working
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, the special rapporteur,
as a single individual of recognized international standing, is ordinarily less
expensive and less visible, as well as more efficient, than the five-member
working group in achieving similar objectives.
The Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances
The Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, which
was initiated by the Commission on Human Rights in 1980,' has developed
an effective approach to coping with the human rights violations within its
narrow mandate.2 The evolution of the working group not only has given
guidance to the special rapporteurs, but has presaged how their activities
will develop.
* The author attended the congress as an observer for the Four Directions Council, a non-
governmental organization in consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social
Council, and foreign affairs officer for the Sante' Mawi'omi wjit Mikmaq (Mikmaq Grand
Council).
'Comm'n on Human Rights [hereinafter cited as CHR] Res. 20 (XXXVI), UN Doc.
E/CN.4/1408, at 180 (1980).
'See Berman & Clark, State Terrorism: Disappearances, 13 RUTGERS L.J. 531, 557-59 (1982);
Reports of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, UN Docs.
E/CN.4/1435 (1981); E/CN.4/1492 (1981); E/CN.4/1983/14; E/CN.4/1984/21 and
Add.1; E/CN.4/1985/15; E/CN.4/1986/18.
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The resolution that established the Working Group on Enforced or In-
voluntary Disappearances gave that body of five members authority (1) to
"examine questions relevant to enforced or involuntary disappearances";
(2) to "seek and receive information from governments, intergovernmental
organizations, humanitarian organizations and other reliable sources"; and
(3) "to bear in mind the need to be able to respond effectively to information
that comes before it and to carry out its work with discretion." It was directed
to report to the Commission's next session.3 While the mandate of the work-
ing group to "examine questions" might at first glance appear to suggest
an academic study of the issue, the working group relied principally upon
its authority to "respond effectively" in raising specific cases of disappear-
ances and in requesting responses from governments without seeking any
publicity about the cases.
After receiving the working group's first report,4 the Commission ex-
tended the group's tenure for another year, but made several significant
changes in its mandate to reflect both approval of and some limitations on
its activities.5 The Commission noted that governments had not always given
the working group the full cooperation "warranted by its strictly humani-
tarian objectives and its working methods based on discretion." 6 The working
group had embarrassed the Argentine Government by reprinting its reply7
in full, and thus the group was reminded "to discharge its mandate with
discretion"; on the one hand, it should "protect persons providing infor-
mation," and on the other, "limit the dissemination of information provided
by Governments."
While the Commission simply extended the working group's mandate in
1982 and 1983 without making significant changes, it did express "complete
confidence" in the group.8 In 1984 the Commission for the first time re-
quested that the working group "help eliminate the practice of enforced or
involuntary disappearances" and encouraged governments to permit the
group to make site visits to fulfill "its mandate more effectively." 9 The Com-
mission continued this approach in 1985.0
The working group's sixth annual report, delivered to the Commission
in 1986," follows the general approach of the group's previous reports. 12
In 1985, for example, the group reported having received 4,500 allegations
of enforced or involuntary disappearances and it had transmitted some 2,200
sufficiently documented cases to various governments.' 3 The 1986 report
CHR Res. 20, supra note 1, at 180-81.
' UN Doc. E/CN.4/1435 and Add.1 (1981).
5 CHR Res. 10 (XXXVII), UN Doc. E/CN.4/1475, at 209-10 (1981).
6Id.
UN Doc. E/CN.4/1435, Ann. IX (1981); see also id., Anns. XI and XIL8 CHR Res. 1982/24, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1982/20, at 139-40; CHR Res. 1983/20, UN
Doc. E/CN.4/1983/60, at 148-49.
9 CHR Res. 1984/24, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1984/77, at 57-58.
10 CHR Res. 1985/20, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1985/66, at 53-54.
ll UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/18. 12Id. at 1.
'3 Id. at 5.
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names the 34 countries about which information on disappearances had
been received. It provides data for all 34 countries on the number of cases
reported, the efforts of the government to clarify them and the number
resolved. As for the 16 countries with a hundred or more disappearances,
the report-besides assessing the reported cases and the efforts to resolve
them-in a new departure includes a historical graph tracing the occurrence
of disappearances over the years. While the report does not correlate the
frequency of disappearances with changes in governmental leadership and
other aspects of the situation in each nation, such a correlation could easily
be accomplished by interested analysts.
The working group has visited five countries altogether. For the first time
in 1986, it issued a separate fact-finding account, which concerns a visit to
Peru. 4 The report is well prepared and thorough, and a very useful guide
to the situation there.
For the second year in a row, the working group recommended to the
Commission that its mandate be extended for 2 years rather than just one,
as had been the practice with working groups, special rapporteurs and special
representatives. 5 In 1986 the Commission granted the request on an ex-
perimental basis, with the understanding that the group would continue to
report on an annual basis.' 6 Next year there will probably be a similar pro-
posal to extend the mandate of the Special Rapporteur on Summary or
Arbitrary Executions or that of the Special Rapporteur on Torture.
The Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances has de-
veloped incrementally into an effective human rights implementation mech-
anism on no broader a consensual basis than a consensus of the Commission
on Human Rights and without the authority of any human rights treaty
beyond the United Nations Charter. The special rapporteurs are gradually
following in the footsteps of the working group.
The Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions
The Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions was the
first special rapporteur on a theme or particular kind of human rights vio-
lation. The 1982 mandate of the special rapporteur was styled to some extent
upon the 1980 resolution that established the working group, that is, to
"examine the questions related to summary or arbitrary executions" and to
report annually to the Commission on the rapporteur's activities.' 7
The Commission had for several years been appointing special rapporteurs
and special representatives for particular countries. For example, at its 1986
session the Commission on Human Rights received fact-finding reports from
special rapporteurs or special representatives on human rights situations in
"UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/18/Add.I. 5 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/18, at 108.
16 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/L.76, adopted with one amendment and without a vote on Mar.
13, 1986.
"7 CHR Res. 1982/29, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1982/30, at 2-3, 147.
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Afghanistan,"8 Chile, 9 El Salvador,2" Guatemala' and Iran.22 These "coun-
try" investigators can provide thorough, relatively detailed, well-analyzed
reports that establish what the international community knows about par-
ticular situations. They make contacts with the government concerned and
may thus attempt to encourage resolution of the human rights problems in
question, but they are not authorized to "respond effectively" to violations.
23
They are necessarily less balanced and less global than the theme special
rapporteurs who look at a human rights phenomenon wherever it appears
around the world. Both types of special rapporteurs, however, rely on similar
sources of information, including nongovernmental organizations such as
Americas Watch, Amnesty International, Helsinki Watch, the International
Commission of Jurists, the International Human Rights Law Group, the
International League for Human Rights, the Lawyers Committee for Human
Rights and a number of national human rights organizations.
Although his position was initiated in March 1982 and his authority con-
firmed by the Economic and Social Council in May 1982, the first Special
Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions, Amos Wako of Kenya,
was not actually appointed by the Chairman of the Human Rights Commis-
sion until August of that year. Rather than take the incremental approach
handed down by the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disap-
pearances, Mr. Wako's first report attempted to begin at the level of activity
that the working group had achieved after several years. He evidently failed
to note that the authorizing resolution did not instruct him to "respond
effectively," but only to gather information, examine the question and report
to the Commission.2 4 Instead, he had ambitiously identified 37 governments
that had allegedly been responsible for summary or arbitrary executions;
he had then sent the allegations to those governments, and the responses of
16 of them were summarized forthrightly in his report.
25
This first report was roundly criticized by members of the Commission-
particularly by representatives of the governments that had been discussed.
Consequently, Mr. Wako was again in 1983 not given authority to "respond
effectively" to summary or arbitrary killings. His second and third reports
omitted most references to countries, 26 except for reprinting the telexes he
"8 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/24; see UN Doc. A/40/843 (1986). The Commission also for
many years has appointed special rapporteurs to engage in various studies without expecting
that they would take action on human rights violations. See, e.g., Rannat, Study of Equality in
the Administration of Justice, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/296/Rev.1 (1972); Ingl6s, Study of
Discrimination in Respect of the Right of Everyone to Leave Any Country, Including His Own,
and to Return to His Country, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/220/Rev.l (1963).
'9 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/2; see UN Doc. A/40/647 (1985).
20 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/22; see UN Doc. A/40/818 (1985).
21 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/23; see UN Doc. A/40/865 (1986).
22 UN Doc. A/40/874 (1985). The special representative of the Commission presented an
interim report to the General Assembly, but resigned before he had completed his report to
the Commission.21 See, e.g., CHR Res. 1985/35, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1985/66, at 74 (mandate of special rap-
porteur on El Salvador).
24 CHR Res. 1982/29, supra note 17, at 147.
25 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1983/16.
26 UN Docs. E/CN.4/1984/29 and E/CN.4/1985/17.
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had continued to send, without clear authority, in an attempt to avert specific
summary or arbitrary executions. Accordingly, the special rapporteur's re-
ports became less controversial; his mandate was more easily renewed in
198427 and 1985,28 and he was finally given authority to "respond effectively
to information that comes before him."
The fourth report29 largely returned to the practice of identifying the
governments that had allegedly engaged in summary or arbitrary executions.
Indeed, the greatest part of the report contained the substance of the special
rapporteur's appeals against summary or arbitrary executions during the
previous year, the requests made by the special rapporteur for information
about past executions and the responses of governments. This laudable rec-
ord demonstrated that the special rapporteur had finally achieved the cred-
ibility he had sought at first and that his initially weak authority had been
enhanced by the Commission. The report indicates that the special rappor-
teur has been quite active in pursuing his mandate and in attempting to
prevent summary or arbitrary executions. The report makes no effort, how-
ever, to resolve the issues raised by the allegations and the replies of gov-
ernments, and it makes only a rudimentary effort to synthesize the material
presented and to draw useful conclusions and recommendations.
Two aspects of the special rapporteur's fourth report may illustrate its
defects and the potential for future work. These two aspects relate to juvenile
executions and the development of standards for the adequate investigation
of suspicious deaths, including adequate autopsies.
Juvenile Executions. In his fourth report, the special rapporteur notes that
he made an appeal to the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bangladesh to prevent
the execution of a student aged 16 or 17 who had been condemned to death
by a special military court in Dhaka."0 The report fails to recount that the
special rapporteur had made appeals to the Government of the United States
on behalf of two youths who faced execution in South Carolina and Texas
for offenses committed while they were under the age of 18. The U.S. Gov-
ernment apparently responded to the appeal on behalf of the Texas youth;
it questioned the special rapporteur's authority to make such appeals. Instead
of reprinting the appeals and the response, the special rapporteur made the
following statement in the last paragraph of his report:
In conclusion, the Special Rapporteur would like to refer to one
issue which he feels deserving of further consideration by the Com-
mission. The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights pro-
scribes the application of the death penalty to anyone below the age of
18 at the time when the offence was committed. While some reservations
have been formally entered to this provision, the Covenant nevertheless
has a special status, having been proclaimed and adopted by the General
Assembly and having received for the most part widespread acknowl-
edgement throughout the international community. In some recent
17 CHR Res. 1984/50, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1984/77, at 8-9, 85.
"' CHR Res. 1985/37, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1985/66, at 3-5,79 (adding "in particular when
a summary or arbitrary execution is imminent or threatened").
29 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/21. so1d. at 4-5.
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instances the attention of the Special Rapporteur has been drawn to
persons executed or about to be executed, having been duly convicted
and sentenced in accordance with the law although it has been estab-
lished beyond doubt that they were under 18 years of age when the
crimes in question were committed. These executions have posed a
difficult principle for the Special Rapporteur because, while it is clear
that the persons in question were duly tried and sentenced and had
every opportunity to appeal, the point nevertheless remains that a
United Nations standard of global validity was not adhered to. The
Special Rapporteur feels that this issue deserves further examination
and he would be grateful for such guidance as the Commission may be
able to offer on this question."
In response to this request for advice, the Norwegian delegate stated
that the
Special Rapporteur has, quite rightly, reminded us that the Interna-
tional Covenant on Civil and Political Rights prohibits the application
of the death penalty to anyone below the age of 18 when the offence
was committed. The Norwegian Government agrees that this issue de-
serves further examination. We believe that such cases are within the
mandate of the Special Rapporteur and should be included in future
reports.8 2
This advice is particularly significant because Norway was the chief sponsor
of the resolution" that extended the mandate of the special rapporteur and
because this view was not contradicted by any other delegation.
Amnesty International and one other nongovernmental organization
elaborated on the Norwegian views by recalling that Article 6(5) of the
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights provides that the sen-
tence of "death shall not be imposed for crimes committed by persons below
eighteen years of age." 4 This provision may not be the subject of derogation
under any circumstances. Similar provisions are found in Article 4(5) of the
American Convention on Human Rights 5 and Article 68 of the Geneva
Convention on the Protection of Civilians in Time of War.3 6 The special
rapporteur notes in his report that "some reservations" have been entered
to Article 6(5) of the Covenant, but this statement appears to be incorrect.
No government has made a reservation on the prohibition of juvenile exe-
cutions3 7
51 Id. at 100.
2 Statement by Representative of Norway to Commission on Human Rights, Mar. 6, 1986,
at 10 (in the author's files).
33 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/L.68, adopted without a vote on Mar. 11, 1986.
34 Art. 6(5), GA Res. 2200, 21 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 16) at 52, UN Doc. A/6316 (1966)
(entered into force Mar. 23, 1976).
" ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, HANDBOOK OF EXISTING RULES FERTAINING TO
HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN SYSTEM 29, Art. 4(5), OEA/Ser.LV/II.60, doc.
28, rev.1 (1983).
s" Art. 68, Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War,
Aug. 12, 1949, 6 UST 3516, TIAS No. 3365, 75 UNTS 287 (entered into force Oct. 21,
1950).
37 In proposing a general reservation to the death penalty limitations of Article 6 of the Civil
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Over two-thirds of the governments of the world have entirely rejected
executions ofjuveniles by having ratified either the International Covenant
or the American Convention, or both; having abolished the death penalty
totally or allowing it for exceptional crimes only; or having exempted ju-
veniles from the death penalty. In those countries which still permit the
death penalty, juvenile executions are exceedingly rare in practice. Since
1979 there have been 11,000 executions in 80 countries; but only 7 of them
in five countries were for offenses committed while under the age of 18.8
The rapporteur's mandate clearly encompasses appeals to prevent the
execution of juvenile offenders. The special rapporteur may be guided in
this regard by the UN Secretary-General; in January of this year, he issued
a public appeal for the life of a young man in South Carolina who was 17
at the time of his offense but had a mental age of only 12. Javier P6rez de
Cu6llar acted pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 36/22, which called
upon the Secretary-General "to use his best endeavours in cases where the
minimum standard of legal safeguards [in the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights] appears not to have been respected." 9 Commission
on Human Rights Resolution 1985/37 confers essentially the same mandate
on Special Rapporteur Wako: "to respond effectively to information that
comes before him, in particular when a summary or arbitrary execution is
imminent or threatened."4 Considering this mandate, the discussion at the
42d session of the Commission ought to constitute sufficient guidance for
the special rapporteur to continue his efforts to prevent the execution of
youthful offenders.
Investigations of Suspicious Deaths. On December 13, 1985, the General
Assembly adopted Resolution 40/143 on summary or arbitrary executions;
it requested that the special rapporteur "consider in his next report possible
measures to be taken by the appropriate authorities when a death occurs in
custody, including adequate autopsy. ' ' 4 1 In only a few weeks, the special
rapporteur's report was scheduled for submission to the February-March
1986 session of the Human Rights Commission. His initial response appeared
in the following paragraph:
and Political Covenant, the Department of State declared that its purpose was "certainly not
the preservation of any right to execute children or pregnant women, something never done
in the United States." International Human Rights Treaties: Hearings Before the Senate Comm. on
Foregn Relations, 96th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 55 (1979) (response by Department of State).
"' See Letter from Eric Prokosch, Coordinator of Amnesty International Program for the
Abolition of the Death Penalty, to Mary E. McClymont, Feb. 19, 1986: "In addition, Amnesty
International received a number of reports of executions of prisoners under 18 years old in
Iran, but the organization was unable to give an exact total."
"' GA Res. 36/22, 36 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 168, UN Doc. A/36/51 (1982). The
resolution specifically refers to "the provisions on capital punishment in the International Cov-
enant on Civil and Political Rights, particularly its articles 6, 14 and 15." Furthermore, in
General Assembly Resolution 35/172, entitled "Arbitrary or summary executions," member
states are urged to "respect as a minimum standard the content of the provisions of articles 6,
14, and 15 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights." GA Res. 35/172, 35
UN GAOR Supp. (No. 48) at 195, UN Doc. A/35/48 (1981).
4 0 CHR Res. 1985/37, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1985/66, at 79.
4' GA Res. 40/143 (Dec. 13, 1985).
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One of the ways in which Governments can show that they want this
abhorrent phenomenon of arbitrary or summary executions eliminated
is by investigating, holding inquests, prosecuting and punishing those
found guilty. There is therefore a need to develop internationa stand-
ards designed to ensure that investigations are conducted into all cases
of suspicious death and in particular those at the hands of the law
enforcement agencies in all situations. Such standards should include
adequate autopsy. A death in any type of custody should be regarded
asprimafacie a summary or arbitrary execution and appropriate inves-
tigations should immediately be made to confirm or rebut the pre-
sumption. The results of investigations should be made public.4 2
One nongovernmental organization4 3 commented on the need for inter-
national standards on the investigation of suspicious deaths, including ade-
quate autopsy. There are many reasons for such standards, the most basic
of which is to ensure that an adequate autopsy and investigation are per-
formed in the often too brief time when an optimal autopsy examination
and investigation are possible. In controversial cases, proponents of different
interpretations may take advantage of any shortcomings in the investigation;
it therefore behooves forensic physicians and other investigators to tolerate
as few omissions or discrepancies as possible. Finally and perhaps most im-
portantly, the existence of internationally accepted standards will enable the
international community of forensic scientists, police officers, prosecuting
lawyers and judges to provide support, some protection and autonomy for
physicians and investigators who might otherwise be intimidated by their
governments or other groups into performing inadequate investigations or
reaching unjustified conclusions.
In response to such concerns, the Commission on Human Rights took
note of "the need to develop international standards designed to ensure
that proper investigations are conducted by appropriate authorities into all
cases of suspicious death, including provisions for adequate autopsy."14 The
Commission then invited the special rapporteur "to receive information from
appropriate United Nations agencies and other international organizations
and to examine the elements to be included in such standards and to report
to the Commission on Human Rights on progress made in this respect. 45
The Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions has not
been as careful and successful in developing his mandate as the Working
Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances. Nevertheless, he has
generally followed the approach of the working group and has been given
the additional responsibility of helping to develop standards on such im-
portant subjects as international norms for the investigation of summary or
arbitrary killings. As will be seen below, the Special Rapporteur on Torture
has benefited both from the mistakes of the Special Rapporteur on Summary
4 2 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/21, at 99.
4. See UN Press Release HR/1848, Mar. 4, 1986, at 6; UN Press Release HR/1848/Corr.1,
Mar. 10, 1986.
44 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/L.68; see note 33 supra.
41 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/L.68.
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or Arbitrary Executions and from the guidance afforded by the Working
Group on Enforced and Involuntary Disappearances.
The Special Rapporteur on Torture
During its session in 1985, the Commission on Human Rights established
a Special Rapporteur on Torture with the authority to "respond effectively
to credible and reliable information" on torture.4 6 It was understood at the
time that the Chairman of the Human Rights Commission would appoint
Professor P. H. Kooijmans of the Netherlands. Professor Kooijmans had
been the head of the Netherlands delegation that had led the effort to es-
tablish a special rapporteur. In addition, the selection of the Dutch delegate
seemed appropriate since the Netherlands was relinquishing its seat on the
Commission to give Belgium an opportunity to represent the Benelux coun-
tries. The special rapporteur's first report was to be presented to the Com-
mission at its 42d session in 1986.47
In many ways, the special rapporteur's report is a model first step in what
promises to be a very effective United Nations approach to a serious human
rights problem. Professor Kooijmans describes the nature of the problem,
his mandate, international legal norms against torture4' and his activities,
including the material he received from governments, the Organization of
American States and nongovernmental organizations such as Amnesty In-
ternational. He established his authority to transmit allegations of torture
to national authorities by sending such information to 33 governments. The
special rapporteur avoids angering these governments unnecessarily in his
initial report by identifying only those nations which were already on the
Commission's agenda, that is, Afghanistan, Chile, El Salvador, Guatemala
and Iran.4 9
Professor Kooijmans also records that he engaged in consultations with
governments, nongovernmental organizations and individuals; without
identifying those involved, he thus established his authority to undertake
such consultations. In addition, he reports his decision to make eight urgent
appeals to governments to prevent the occurrence of torture in Chile, the
Comoros, Ecuador, Honduras, Indonesia, South Africa, Uganda and the
USSR. The special rapporteur identifies some of these urgent situations
very briefly and is careful to describe the governmental response, if any.
For example, the report states, "The Special Rapporteur was informed that
the USSR rejected the allegation sent to it as baseless and false and pointed
out that the action of the Special Rapporteur violated the provisions of the
Commission resolution 1985/33. "5o While the report does not contain even
46 CHR Res. 1985/33, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1985/66, at 71.
17 Report by the Special Rapporteur on Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15.
" E.g., Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment, GA Res. 39/46, 39 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 197, UN Doc. A/39/51 (1986).
" UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15, at 16. 50 Id. at 17.
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a vague description of the problem that prompted this brusque reply, it
appears to have been reports of psychiatric abuse in the USSR.'"
The remainder of the report largely deals with national legislative pro-
visions forbidding torture; the barring of statements induced by torture as
evidence in proceedings; the provision of remedies, such as amparo or habeas
corpus, for torture allegations; and legislative provisions on matters creating
a risk of torture, such as incommunicado detention, states of emergency and
trade in implements of torture. Although countries are very rarely identified,
except in a positive light, the United States is mentioned because of the
export regulations regarding "specially designed implements of torture."' 2
The report concludes by listing the kinds of torture that have been identified,
analyzing briefly the relationship between torture and other sorts of human
rights violations (such as disappearances, arbitrary killings) and submitting
a set of recommendations.
In general, the special rapporteur's work was well received by the Com-
mission in March 1986. Some human rights advocates did find fault with
one of Kooijmans's recommendations, i.e., "Incommunicado detention
should be kept as short as possible and should not exceed seven days.""
While they welcomed the special rapporteur's concern that incommunicado
detention might foster torture, they were worried that specifying 7 days
might make permissible such a lengthy period of incommunicado detention,
during which torture might be undertaken.
When the Commission debated the agenda item entitled "Question of
the human rights of all persons subjected to any form of detention or im-
prisonment," which includes a review of the work of the Special Rapporteur
on Torture, the Australian delegation introduced an idea borrowed from
the Special Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions: that inter-
national standards be set for investigations into "cases of suspicious death,
and that these investigations should include an adequate autopsy." Australia
pointed to "the general need for accurate information to determine the
cause of death where there is suspicion of torture" and reiterated the ad-
vantages international standards would confer on practitioners that were
mentioned in the debate on summary and arbitrary executions."'
Although these sentiments were not reflected in the Belgian resolution
to prolong the special rapporteur's mandate for another year, the Commis-
sion is definitely beginning to see the theme special rapporteurs as a mech-
anism not only for implementing human rights norms but also for developing
standards. Ireland, Norway and the United States cosponsored the resolution
as members of the Commission, and the Netherlands cosponsored it as an
"' The delegates of the Soviet Union at the Commission indicated their displeasure, but
failed to explain why they believed that this brief mention of their country was somehow beyond
the special rapporteur's mandate. Indeed, the sensitivity of the Soviet authorities to this appeal
by the rapporteur bodes well for his effectiveness.
52 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/15, at 30. 5 Id. at 35.
"
4 Australia, Statement to the UN Commission on Human Rights on Agenda Item 10, Mar.
12, 1986, at 4 (in the author's files).
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observer. Only the Soviet Union spoke against the resolution, but its op-
position was undercut by the decision at the last moment of Argentina and
Senegal to add their names as cosponsors. With such broad support, the
resolution was adopted on March 13, 1986 without a vote."5
The Special Rapporteur on Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or
Belief
The most significant single development at the 42d session of the Human
Rights Commission was its decision in March 1986 to establish a Special
Rapporteur on Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.56
The newest special rapporteur will presumably follow the same approach as
his predecessors, that is, to study the phenomenon of intolerance and dis-
crimination based on religion or belief; to "respond effectively to credible
and reliable information that comes before him and to carry out his work
with discretion and independence";" and to report to the Commission at
its next session in 1987 about his activities.
The decision to establish a Special Rapporteur on Intolerance and Dis-
crimination Based on Religion or Belief arose from a long history of United
Nations activity on this issue 58 culminating in the proclamation by the General
Assembly in 1981 of the Declaration on the Elimination of All Forms of
Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on Religion or Belief.5 9 The Dec-
laration was the product of 20 years of drafting work in the Commission on
Human Rights and the very thorough Study on Discrimination in the Matter
of Religious Rights and Practices, released in 1960.60 The new special rap-
porteur has been asked to "examine" "incidents and governmental actions
in all parts of the world which are inconsistent with the provisions of the
Declaration."6 1
The United States was the principal sponsor of the resolution that estab-
lished the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intolerance; cosponsors included
s UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/L.83, adopted without a vote on Mar. 13, 1986.
The Commission on Human Rights decided on Mar. 10, 1986 to adopt (with a few amend-
ments) the resolution contained in UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/L.45/Rev1, which proposed the
appointment of the special rapporteur. See CHR Res. 1986/20, UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/65,
at 66.
57 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/L.45/Rev.1.
5 See Clark, The United Nations and Religious Freedom, 11 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 197
(1978); S. LISKOFSKY, UNITED NATIONS DRAFT DECLARATION ON THE ELIMINATION OF ALL
FORMS OF RELIGIOUS INTOLERANCE (198 1).
59 GA Res. 36/55, 36 UN GAOR Supp. (No. 51) at 171-72, UN Doc. A/36/51 (1982).
0 A. Krishnaswami, Study of Discrimination in the Matter of Religious Rights and Practices,
UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/200/Rev.1 (1960); see also R. Clark, Background Paper for United
Nations Seminar on the Encouragement of Understanding, Tolerance and Respect in Matters
Relating to Religion or Belief, Geneva, Switzerland, 3-14 December 1984, UN Doc.
HR/GENEVA/1984/BP.3.
61 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/L45/Rev.1. The Declaration forbids discrimination on grounds
of religion or beliefs; protects the right of parents to organize their family life in accordance
with their religious beliefs; assures rights to worship, assemble for worship, establish religious
institutions, observe religious holidays, teach religion, designate appropriate religious
leaders, etc.
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Belgium, Canada, Costa Rica, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Nor-
way and Senegal. In addition, the Holy See lobbied for the resolution, par-
ticularly with predominantly Catholic countries.
The United States had to overcome several impediments to getting the
resolution adopted. First, since religious intolerance is very widespread, many
governments might have feared that the special rapporteur would criticize
their countries. The Soviet Union and its allies in particular suspected that
the special rapporteur might be used to criticize them. Second, since 1983
religious intolerance had been the subject of a study by another special rap-
porteur under the aegis of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrim-
ination and Protection of Minorities.6 2 Some delegates believed that the
Sub-Commission's special rapporteur, Elizabeth Odio Benito of Costa Rica,6 3
should complete her work before the appointment of another special rap-
porteur with a far broader and more active mandate.
Third, the Australian delegation and some others were concerned that
problems of religious intolerance were not amenable to the relatively direct
approaches used by the Special Rapporteurs on Torture and on Summary
or Arbitrary Executions. Finally, some delegations were disturbed that the
United States had taken this initiative without involving either Ireland or
the World Council of Churches. The Irish Government had taken the re-
sponsibility in previous years for the Commission's activities in regard to
religious intolerance. The World Council of Churches was somewhat upset
at having been bypassed, while the Holy See had been consulted. The World
Council lobbied and made a public statement 64 to the Commission raising
some of the questions enumerated above, but it ultimately supported the
resolution after the changes proposed by Australia were incorporated.
The U.S. delegation attacked these obstacles with a concerted lobbying
effort that included appeals by U.S. embassy staffs to the foreign ministries
of the governments that sit on the Human Rights Commission. There were
also extensive consultations within the "Western European and Other
Group" of Commission members. While the Irish delegation never became
a cosponsor of the resolution, Ireland did in the end support the U.S. ini-
tiative. The U.S. delegation in Geneva also lobbied actively with all the other
members of the Commission, arguing that the Declaration on Religious In-
tolerance provided a sufficient basis for its implementation through a special
rapporteur6 5 The United States pointed out that the Odio Benito study was
progressing rather slowly 65 and that its purpose was sufficiently different to
permit the prompt establishment of the new special rapporteur. The United
62 CHR Res. 1983/40, 1983 UN ESCOR Supp. (No. 3) at 173, UN Doc. E/CN.k/1983/60.
6 Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities Res. 1983/
31, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/43, at 98.
64 Oral intervention by Representative of the Commission of the Churches on International
Affairs of the World Council of Churches to the Commission on Human Rights, February 1986
(in the author's files).
65 Statement by Alternative United States Representative to Commission on Human Rights,
Feb. 24, 1986 (in the author's files).
6 Progress report by Elizabeth Odio Benito, UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1985/28.
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States agreed that a separate resolution should be adopted by consensus to
allow Mrs. Odio Benito to complete her study during the coming year.67 It
was also agreed that the Odio Benito resolution should be adopted without
a vote before the Commission considered the U.S. proposal.
On the evening of March 10, 1986, the United States introduced the
resolution as principal sponsor. On the basis of consultations with Australia,
the United States accepted several revisions, which were announced orally
at the time of the debate. One revision added the recognition "that the
problem of such intolerance and discrimination requires sensitivity in its
resolution." Another significant addition indicated that the special rappor-
teur was "to recommend remedial measures including, as appropriate, the
promotion of dialogue between communities of religion or belief and their
Governments."
In a lively debate, the resolution was strongly opposed by the delegates
of the German Democratic Republic and the Soviet Union. A GDR motion
not to take a vote was defeated on a roll call ballot of 7 in favor, 22 against
and 14 abstaining.6" The Human Rights Commission then took a roll call
vote in which 26 governments voted for the U.S. proposal. Only 5 govern-
ments opposed the resolution, including Bulgaria, Byelorussia, the German
Democratic Republic, Syria and the USSR.69 Twelve governments abstained.
While the U.S. delegation had succeeded in initiating a significant im-
provement in the international implementation of the Declaration on the
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and of Discrimination Based on
Religion or Belief, there remained the question of who would be selected
as the new special rapporteur. Both supporters and opponents of the reso-
lution agreed that it would be very difficult to find an "individual of rec-
ognized international standing" with an appropriate religious background
and nationality, and sufficient sensitivity to take action on this difficult issue.
However, the experience of the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
Disappearances and the two other theme special rapporteurs should prove
to be instructive to the new special rapporteur.
Ad Hoc Improvements and Orderly Consolidation
In the interest of rationality and order in human rights implementation,
one might have hoped that the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary
67 UN Doc. E/CN.4/1986/L.44. Since the UN Sub-Commission's 1986 session was postponed
to 1987, the Odio Benito report will presumably be submitted then.
" The opponents of the U.S. initiative might have been more successful if they had convinced
one or more Third World governments, such as Syria or Algeria, to introduce a series of
crippling amendments to the U.S. resolution. For example, one amendment might have delayed
the effectiveness of the special rapporteur until the completion of Mrs. Odio Benito's work.
Crippling amendments could have delayed a substantive vote or undermined the basic resolution.
If the opponents had tired the delegates with procedural obstructions, the Commission might
have been sufficiently discouraged to accept the motion not to take a vote on the special rap-
porteur.
9 Algeria and Nicaragua voted in favor of the GDR procedural resolution, but abstained
on the substantive vote.
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Disappearances and the three theme special rapporteurs would have been
unified into a single institution rather than resting in four parallel struc-
tures.7" Certainly, these four procedures are quite similar and their human
rights concerns may overlap. For example, a "disappeared" person is quite
likely to suffer torture, and may well be subjected to a summary or arbitrary
execution. At least in some parts of the world, disappearances, torture and
arbitrary killings arise out of religious intolerance. Nevertheless, it would
have been politically impossible for these four procedures to have been del-
egated initially to a single special rapporteur, working group or other body;
it is doubtful that they will ever be unified; and there are some good reasons
against such a combination.
The Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances and the
three special rapporteurs arose out of a pressing need for international scru-
tiny of their respective areas of human rights concern,7 ' but the Commission
on Human Rights initially gave them very limited authority. The four pro-
cedures have followed an identifiable pattern of slowly developing their le-
gitimacy and thus their authority to implement human rights within their
mandate. Governments have reluctantly accepted these improvements; they
would probably have rejected any larger or more unified grant of authority.
Now that these four procedures do exist, it is more likely that they could
be unified. Yet for years the United Nations has resisted the concept of a
High Commissioner for Human Rights.7 2 There is considerable suspicion
in the United Nations of any such aggregation of human rights implemen-
tation competence in a body that lacks the authority of a specific treaty.
Indeed, the working group and three special rapporteurs have relatively
rare international authority to take action in emergency situations to prevent
or seek prompt governmental attention to disappearances, torture., summary
or arbitrary killings and religious intolerance. 7
There are several good reasons for opposing such a unification. First, the
70 Cf, e.g., Meron, Norm Making and Supervision in International Human Rights: Reflections on
Institutional Order, 76 AJIL 754, 771, 774-75 (1982).
71 See, e.g., Kramer & Weissbrodt, The 1980 U.N. Commission on Human Rights and the Disap-
peared, 1 HuM. RTs. Q. 18 (1981); Shestack, The Case of the Disappeared, HUM. RTs., No. 4,
Winter 1980, at 24, 52.
72 See R. CLARK, A UNITED NATIONS HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (1972).
"The Committee againstTorture has analogous authority under Article 20 of the Convention
against Torture for those governments which do not make a declaration under Article 28 to
reject such authority. Convention against Torture, supra note 48, Arts. 20 and 28. The Com-
mittee on Human Rights and the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination have
treaty-based authority to take interim measures to avoid irreparable damage. Optional Protocol
to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 34, Art. 5. Rules of
Procedure of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Rule 94, UN Doc.
CERD/C/35/Rev.3, at 28 (1986). The Human Rights Committee has taken interim measures
under the Optional Protocol. See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, Selected Decisions under the
Optional Protocol, UN Doc. CCPR/C/OP/I, at 5-6 (1985). The Inter-American Com-
mission on Human Rights and the UN Secretary-General have regularly undertaken urgent
appeals on human rights matters. See ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES, HANDBOOK, supra
note 35, at 130; Ramcharan, The Good Offices of the United Nations Secretary-General in the Field
of Human Rights, 76 AJIL 130, 136-39 (1982).
CURRENT DEVELOPMENTS
success of special rapporteurs depends largely on the personal standing,
intelligence and motivation of the individuals who hold that position, as well
as on their ability to focus on a single issue. Second, although there is some
potential overlap in the jurisdiction of the four procedures, it may not be
helpful to combine them. For example, the working group has refused to
concede lightly that "disappeared" persons may have died and has insisted
upon governmental accountings for all disappearances. Such a position would
be more difficult to maintain if the working group also had jurisdiction to
pursue arbitrary killings. Third, there is some benefit in having several pro-
cedures for expressing concern-hence several channels for applying pres-
sure-about a particular case. Fourth, although there are similarities among
the four procedures, it is too soon to establish a rigid and uniform approach
to such human rights violations while experimentation with ways to "respond
effectively" continues. A single unified procedure would probably be given
the least common denominator of authority rather than the greatest possi-
ble reach.
Conclusion
During the past half-dozen years, the UN Commission on Human Rights
has initiated several innovative approaches to implementing international
human rights norms. Among the most flexible and potentially effective are
the Working Group on Enforced or Involuntary Disappearances, the Special
Rapporteur on Summary or Arbitrary Executions, the Special Rapporteur
on Torture and, most recently, the Special Rapporteur on Religious Intol-
erance. Despite their notable gains, the four procedures still have the po-
tential for further improvement and creative interaction. Governments and
nongovernmental organizations already recognize the importance of the
working group and the three theme special rapporteurs in protecting against
particularly grievous violations of human rights throughout the world. To
improve their effectiveness, these four procedures deserve more attention,
support and constructive criticism from governments, human rights activists,
scholars and the media.
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THE NEW WORLD SATELLITE ORDER: A REPORT FROM GENEVA
In a city that hosts a continuous series of international gatherings, last
year's path-breaking Geneva conference on satellite communications went
largely unnoticed as the news media concentrated on preparations for the
Reagan-Gorbachev summit.1 Yet for many of the 112 nations attending this
* Professor of Law, University of Minnesota. The author was an observer at the Commission's
1980-1986 sessions.
The New York Times, for example, devoted only one major story to the conference. Nether,
Third World Seeks Its Place In Space, N.Y. Times, Sept. 15, 1985, §E, at 21. The absence of
significant press coverage can be attributed, in part, to the ITU's self-imposed exclusion of
journalists. Ironically, the world's foremost international telecommunications body is almost
the only United Nations agency to maintain such a ban (the other offender is the International
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